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Abstract
Security risk assessment methods have served us well over the
last two decades. As the complexity, pervasiveness and au-
tomation of technology systems increases, particularly with the
Internet of Things (IoT), there is a convincing argument that
we will need new approaches to assess risk and build system
trust. In this article, we report on a series of scoping work-
shops and interviews with industry professionals (experts in
enterprise systems, IoT and risk) conducted to investigate the
validity of this argument. Additionally, our research aims to
consult with these professionals to understand two crucial as-
pects. Firstly, we seek to identify the wider concerns in adopt-
ing IoT systems into a corporate environment, be it a smart
manufacturing shop floor or a smart office. Secondly, we in-
vestigate the key challenges for approaches in industry that at-
tempt to effectively and efficiently assess cyber-risk in the IoT.
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is set to change our society in
ways potentially as significant as the internet itself. Beyond
the buzzword and supposition of all devices being connected,
the IoT is actually a complex technological paradigm. This is,
in part, due to the reality that it represents the convergence of
varying visions for the future of technology [1]. The disruptive
nature of the IoT presents society with a range of advantages
but also several noteworthy challenges with its widespread use.
On the one hand, the IoT stands to significantly increase pro-
ductivity and efficiency in domains such as manufacturing and
agriculture. Some studies suggest that the expected economic
impact is likely to reach at least $4 trillion per year by 2025 [2].
Apart from economics, there is the tangible likelihood of this
new paradigm to save lives when we reflect on the domain of
smart health [3], for example. On the other hand however, se-
curity in such a disruptive and complex paradigm can prove
extremely challenging. Threats may originate from physical
or cyber-attacks and may target any of the central layers of an
IoT system; many of which are known to have shortcomings
in terms of security and privacy [4].
The way that organisations have been conditioned to respond
to threats and vulnerabilities in systems — be they IoT-oriented
or otherwise — is guided by the process of risk assessment.
Such assessments often occur through the use of well-regarded
methodologies such as the National Institute of Standards and
Technology’s (NIST) Special Publications (e.g., SP800-30,
SP800-37), industry-developed standards including the ISO
27000 series, and others. These assessments have the goal of
identifying relevant assets, vulnerabilities and threats, along
with associated likelihoods and impacts; when appropriately
combined, these then lead to the definition of risks facing
a system. These risk assessment approaches have served
us well over the past decade, and have provided a platform
through which organisations and governments could better
protect themselves against pertinent risks.
There are, however, several issues which we believe will im-
pact the application of existing security assessment method-
ologies to IoT systems. These include the inadequate nature
of current periodic (e.g., quarterly or annually) assessments,
unknown system boundaries at the time of assessment given
dynamic IoT systems, and failure to consider assets as avenues
of attack instead of only as items of value [5]. These are all key
issues which we posit raise substantial challenges for organi-
sations as they aim to assess risk in IoT or connected systems,
before then deciding on appropriate risk treatments.
In this paper we build on our earlier research [5] by reporting
on a series of scoping workshops and interviews with profes-
sionals from industry and business sectors. The aim of this en-
gagement has been to validate the key issues identified above
and their significance as it pertains to identifying and assessing
cyber-risk. We view this as a novel and essential contribution
because it ensures that our research is well-informed by current
practice, and real business scenarios and context. Furthermore,
we believe that the IoT security research field in general stands
to benefit from this stakeholder engagement. The reason for
this is because it aids in elucidating the real concerns held by
industry, and informing the direction of future research.
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Our article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reflects
on related research in the domain of cyber-risks, risk assess-
ment for systems and connected IoT systems. Next we present
an overview of the core issues that are hypothesised to compli-
cate IoT risk assessment in Section 3. Section 4 then details
the research approach adopted to examine the aforementioned
issues and related cyber security challenges with industry pro-
fessionals. This is followed by Section 5 which presents and
discusses the core research findings from the study. Here we
also highlight the implications for IoT risk assessment research
going forward. The article then concludes in Section 6 and de-
fines avenues for future work.
2 Background and related work
2.1 IoT systems and security concerns
The Internet of Things is the intersection of three visions for
the future of technology [1]. These are the Things-oriented
vision (essentially, the use and presence of various electron-
ically tagged things), the Semantic-oriented vision (meant to
address issues of how to represent, connect and store items)
and the internet-oriented vision (which encourages the use of
web standards to interconnect items). Hints of each of these vi-
sions can be found in commonly used definitions for IoT, i.e.,
interconnected networks of digitised physical devices which
interact to achieve some purpose.
IoT systems can generally be divided into the following envi-
ronments: applications, cloud services and things (physical or
digital) [5]. Applications chart the objective of the IoT system,
and cover domains such as smart health, smart factories and
building automation. The purpose of the cloud environment
(cloud computing or services) is to compose and enact a series
of dynamic services (typically software components) to realise
the application. Things are used by services to interact with the
real world, and include devices, sensors and actuators. These
can be called upon, changed or added to as needed.
Since its inception, security, privacy and trust have been key
concerns in IoT systems. Security, in particular, has drawn sig-
nificant attention given its use as an enabler for achieving pri-
vacy and system trust. There are many challenges to attaining
security in the IoT, but some of the most central in the literature
pertain to identity and authentication, access control, protocol
and network security, fault tolerance and governance [4, 6].
For any implementation of IoT to be successful, these need to
be adequately researched and addressed.
At the more granular level, another area covered by related
works is the definition of risks and threats from the integra-
tion of IoT into systems. In Babar et al. [7] for instance, an
IoT threat taxonomy has been proposed which defines threats
to storage management (e.g., key management confidential-
ity), communication (e.g., denial of service on IoT devices),
dynamic binding (issues regarding naming and addressing of
connected things) and embedded systems (e.g., side-channel
and tampering attacks). Other work outlines a layered ap-
proach to understanding IoT security issues, with threats and
solutions defined in terms of the application, transport and per-
ception layers [8]. A notable observation from this reflection is
that many existing security issues are exacerbated by the IoT
context—these may be general problems such as Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks or specific issues including
insider threat [9, 10]. A key factor in these cases is the low-
resource nature of IoT devices, their pervasiveness, and their
open accessibility over the internet.
2.2 The risk assessment context
To manage security concerns, organisations typically rely on
some form of risk management process. Within risk manage-
ment, risk assessment allows for the identification and priori-
tisation of risks (and inclusive factors such as threats, vulner-
abilities, impacts, etc.), while risk treatment considers the en-
terprise’s security posture before determining how to treat each
risk defined. A few common examples of approaches that are
used and promoted to assess risks are NIST SP800-30 [11],
OCTAVE [12], IRAM2 [13] and ISRAM [14]. Overall, these
follow similar underlying methods and only differ in how they
orient themselves, for instance, around assets/threats or using
qualitative or quantitative assessment ratings.
For the IoT context however, there are few methods proposed
in the literature to assess IoT system risks. In many cases,
traditional methods (such as those above) are applied to IoT
scenarios or the general guidance put forward is not tailored
to IoT systems or their dynamics; see [15]. This is quite con-
cerning as we will discuss in Section 3 when we reflect on the
shortcomings of such approaches. Of the methods specifically
created for the IoT, we noticed that these tended to focus more
on automated, mathematical approaches. This was as opposed
to process-driven techniques similar to NIST, OCTAVE, and
the others mentioned above.
The most noteworthy of the IoT approaches include: the
IoTRiskAnalyzer framework which formally and quantita-
tively analyses IoT risks using probabilistic model check-
ing [16]; the framework proposed by Ge et al. for graphi-
cally modelling and assessing security for the IoT through for-
mal system definitions [17]; methods which adopt Bayesian
techniques to assessment including attack graphs and inference
networks [18, 19]; and SecKit, a model-based security toolkit
for identifying and addressing IoT risks [20]. These methods
generally seek to provide an automated way to conduct risk as-
sessment and thereby increase efficiency while removing some
subjectivity from the traditional manual process.
3 Assessing security risks in IoT systems
Risk assessment is a difficult process in general [21, 22], and
one which we believe is even more challenging when assess-
ing risks in IoT systems. This is particularly the case when
traditional approaches to assess risk are applied (as is largely
the case today), because they fail to cater for the nuances of
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the IoT. In our prior research [5], we have outlined four key
reasons why security risks assessments as currently designed
are lacking for the IoT context. We briefly recap these below.
The first concern is that current risk assessment approaches are
based on periodic assessment and assume that systems will not
significantly change in a short period of time. These assump-
tions do not hold for the IoT, where there is vast variability in
scale of systems, dynamism and system coupling.
If we take Figure 1 as an example, at Time0 the manufacturing
IoT system may be composed of a specific set of services and
things. At Time1 (which may be hours or days later) however,
we can see that this set has increased based on the items in the
Things environment. This may be due to changing needs of
the system, adaptations to increase efficiency or newly inter-
connected services—a new third party (Organisation E) may
needed to provide machine parts or support in-situ systems for
instance. The difficulty faced is that a risk assessment may
be conducted at Time0 but the adaptation at Time1 may arise
long before the system is due for reassessment (which is typ-
ically a quarterly or bi-annual activity in organisations). The
traditional processes, therefore, can lead to drastically outdated
assessments.
Fig. 1: IoT systems dynamically changing over time
A second factor to consider is that the detailed knowledge typ-
ically required to conduct traditional risk assessments (on as-
sets, threats, vulnerabilities, and so on) is extremely challeng-
ing to attain considering the highly dynamic nature of IoT sys-
tems. Systems are difficult to keep track of and often have
unknown components a priori [1]. In our Figure 1 example,
at Time0 risk assessors may have little knowledge of the full
complement of systems that may be integrated at runtime (i.e.,
the extent of Time1). Without a good understanding of the
assets constituting the system, assessors cannot use existing
methods to reason about potential threats, vulnerabilities, at-
tack likelihoods or impacts. Even in cases where this data ex-
ists, it may be internal to a partnering company (e.g., Organi-
sation E) not willing to share it and risk exposing themselves.
Another concern is that traditional assessments focus on tangi-
ble assets often at the expense of intangibles. This problem has
been hinted at in existing research where tacit knowledge—
which in some cases is more important than physical assets—
was found to be overlooked in existing security risk assess-
ments [23]. In the IoT, such oversights are concerning be-
cause of the presence of key intangibles including the pro-
cesses through which devices are bound, the connections that
allow them to couple and operate, and the inner workings of
the system actors themselves. Each of these is a potential area
of new risk which needs to be adequately risk assessed. As an
example, consider the case where attackers are able to gain in-
sight into the logical setup of cloud services or how IoT assets
were dynamically referenced and bound. This could be used
to determine where best to target to disrupt the overall appli-
cation. This however, is not a focus of standard assessment
techniques.
Lastly, as was witnessed in the 2016 Dyn cyber-attack [10]
which leveraged compromised IoT devices (much like those in
the Things environment in Figure 1), there is a strong argument
for viewing organisational assets not only as items of value but
as attack platforms. This view is supported by earlier works
such as the intrusion kill chain, where compromised assets can
be used to further attacks [24]. It would be prudent, therefore,
for organisations to accommodate for these new types of risks
into their risk assessment processes. This currently is not done,
and it raises numerous new questions pertaining to where the
boundaries of risk assessment in the IoT should lie.
4 Our approach to consulting industry experts
While academic literature and industry reports can provide
useful insight into the challenges encountered when organisa-
tions try to assess risks in connected and IoT infrastructures,
there is also great value in consulting industry experts directly.
Such individuals may be used to validate (or invalidate) the is-
sues identified, and further elucidate the peculiarities of risk
assessment in connected systems. To achieve this, we reached
out to several industry-based professionals with experience,
knowledge and expertise in the areas of enterprise systems,
IoT, engineering, risks assessment, and organisational security.
This followed a snowball sampling approach where we polled
our direct contacts and sought to recruit others via those con-
tacts. We then filtered the respondents based on profession and
experience to ensure that they had the necessary expertise.
Once the set of professionals were recruited, we then con-
ducted a series of small workshops and interviews. Work-
shops were operated similar to focus groups [25], and therefore
allowed us to pose discussion points (guided questions) and
then step back whilst professionals deliberated the topic. We
used semi-structured interviews for participants unable to at-
tend workshops. The semi-structured format was preferred to
facilitate guided questioning (identical to the workshops) but
also to allow for unplanned avenues of inquiry to be pursued.
Subsequently, all data gathered was transcribed and we applied
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the content analysis technique [25] to assess and draw insights
from our findings.
Considering that a key aim of the study was to validate or refute
the issues identified in our earlier work, we decided to prepare
a briefing document for circulation before the study. This brief
contained an expanded version of the four core issues put for-
ward in Section 3. We asked participants to critically reflect
on the document before the study, and for all cases, it was sent
two weeks prior to the session.
The flow of the sessions involved first gathering professionals’
general feedback (agreement or disagreement) on the points
raised in the brief and then posing a series of questions specif-
ically pertaining to cyber-risk in IoT systems. These aimed to
elicit professional views regarding IoT embedded into corpo-
rate environments, perspectives on risk assessment generally,
and any pressing concerns they had regarding risk assessment
given the dynamics of the IoT. To summarise a number of the
key points, we also presented a set of hypotheses for partici-
pant feedback. These included:
• Risk assessment approaches for the IoT that adopt a peri-
odic assessment instead of incorporating the potential for
changes in the IoT system (e.g., shifting boundaries) will
miss significant risks.
• Limited system knowledge in IoT and coupled systems is
a key issue impacting security risk assessment.
• The logical glue through which IoT systems are bound is
an area not adequately covered in current risk assessment,
but if it is exploited, it could have a significant impact on
IoT systems.
• Risk assessments that only consider assets as items of
value as opposed to items that may be used as an attack
platform, will miss risks in the IoT environment.
Having introduced the study approach, next we present and
discuss the findings.
5 Results and discussion
The aim of our study was to gain an in depth understanding
of the challenges that professionals face as they assess risks in
environments containing IoT systems. Following our recruit-
ment and study structure, we conducted two workshops and
one interview, most lasting one hour. All participants were
knowledgeable in enterprise systems, risk assessment and IoT
systems, and were employed by medium-to-large technology
enterprises. In the sections that follows, we identify and reflect
on the most significant points emerging from the study.
5.1 Periodic assessment versus an evolving IoT system
In our discussions with industry professionals, one of the most
noteworthy points to emerge was that IoT systems, by their
nature, are capable of continuously evolving during opera-
tions. This evolution encompasses the addition of new devices
and services (of varying levels of intelligence and processing
power) to the system, and the automated adaptation of the sys-
tem to cater to the application scenario. Such new devices may
include sensors intended to take measurements of some physi-
cal object or tertiary cloud services instantiated to support rea-
soning and prediction of actions based on those new measure-
ments. As a result of this constant evolution, the study par-
ticipants expressed that risk assessment is substantially more
challenging and that periodic assessment would not be suffi-
cient.
One practitioner aptly summarised the others, while also mak-
ing specific reference to the scale of devices and resulting dif-
ficult in attempting to assess risks. During his workshop, he
stated:
..because of the explosion in devices, it is difficult
to keep track of these devices and their capabilities
... Knowing which devices are potentially compro-
misable and which are not, is an ongoing challenge,
and one that changes on a day-by-day basis.
The central point emerging here was that because IoT systems
can change so quickly, periodic assessments stand to over-
look the increasing variety of risks that accompany these newly
added devices, services and technologies. This speaks directly
to our first hypothesis and supports its validity. The issue of
‘keeping up with risks’ (due to a difficulty in ‘keeping up with
the system assets’) was seen as one of the primary predica-
ments and a core shortcoming of current risk assessment sys-
tems when applied to any dynamic system context.
In addition to the challenges above, participants identified two
other issues with periodic assessment which are likely to be ex-
acerbated when applied to IoT systems; both of these relate to
the security culture of organisations. The first issue pertained
to the fact that in many organisations today, particularly Small-
to-Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), security is viewed as a
single point to be reached as opposed to continuous set of ac-
tions and behaviours. As commented by one professional:
..once they have reached a level of security, they are
often tempted to think that the task is complete. The
fact that security is dynamic and is changing all the
time is something these companies will need to get
accustomed to as this is not their expectation.
This is an important observation because single levels of secu-
rity are often supported by, and suited to, periodic risk assess-
ments. That is, once an assessment is complete and security
measures have been implemented, the security problem is re-
garded as ‘solved’ for another year. These perceptions view
systems and security as static items, while the reality is that
maintaining IoT systems and bolstering their security is now
a more dynamic task than before. With regards to the empha-
sis on SMEs above, this might be expected given their limited
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budgets and confirmed reports into underinvestment in cyber-
security [26]. The reality is, however, that SMEs often work
with larger corporations and internal risks can easily be passed
from one to the other.
The second issue supports the first point and highlights the be-
lief of a few participants that some companies still view risk
assessment as a checkbox exercise. In those cases, risk assess-
ment is not motivated by a real desire to identify, prioritise and
address risk and ensure organisations are adequately protected.
Instead, it is driven by regulations and process. Although the
link between security and regulations is well-known [27], regu-
lations may be years behind systems as progressive as the IoT.
A good security culture which appreciates risk is paramount
for systems today, and especially for the connectivity facili-
tated in coupled systems.
5.2 Risk assessing a complex, autonomous black box
Another area of focus within our sessions with industry pro-
fessionals was the level of knowledge and insight typically
maintained by users and security teams into IoT systems. We
were interested in understanding this generally, but especially
in determining how knowledge (or lack thereof) has an im-
pact on how risk are assessed in organisations. The first salient
point made by the group was that IoT systems are becom-
ing extremely complex and have constantly shifting system
boundaries—these factors, according to the participants, make
it increasingly difficult to do good risk assessment. Speaking
on this situation, a participant stated:
If you can’t understand it [the system], you can’t
properly assess it! Also, failure to understand a sys-
tem means that if people make changes to it, it is
not possible to appreciate the implications. This is a
common problem in software engineering when try-
ing to make changes in complex software systems.
This perspective identifies the difficulty in risk assessment due
to system complexity, but also highlights the real challenge of
tracking changes and updates to the system and their impli-
cations. This is a salient observation because it suggests that
knowing the devices and services present within an IoT sys-
tem is not sufficient. We also need to understand and track
how changes are made to the underlying systems, their impact
on the wider system, and the subsequent repercussions on risk.
While intelligent, highly dynamic, inter-organisational sys-
tems are a fundamental part of the IoT, participants also felt
that these features introduced numerous issues in defining and
tracking risks. In some highly automated and intelligent IoT
systems for instance, machines reason and communicate with-
out the involvement of individuals, which means that in many
cases workers may not fully understand the spectrum of risks in
such systems. This is particularly problematic from a legal per-
spective if issues arise and there is a requirement to determine
who is responsible. There is also the real situation that de-
velopers of original IoT systems may be employees who have
since left the organisation or external firms who offer limited
support. Both of these cases can result in a severely limited un-
derstanding of enterprise IoT risk and where that risk resides.
A related point worthy of mention is that according to some
professionals, IoT systems are black boxes. This perception is
caused by the difficulty in knowing exactly what is happening
on the system or its various connected components. The lim-
ited knowledge of these new systems is especially concerning
because, as participants mentioned, they are connected to the
Internet and thereby open a new platform of attack (be it in-
filtration or exfiltration). Additionally, professionals expressed
concern about individual smart devices being integrated into
corporate networks—these can span from sensors on manu-
facturing floors to office smart displays or Amazon Alexa for
work. As one professional summarised:
Traditionally, companies would have full control
over systems on their networks and be able to secure
them and interact as desired. ... With IoT, devices
are now placed on organisational networks but they
are complete ‘black boxes’. You have no control over
the software or what the device is doing, other than
what is disseminated by the manufacturer/provider.
This opinion touches on the issues of control and trust, which
have become core to the success of connected systems. In the
IoT, organisations are often required to relinquish control and
trust other parties. This is contrary to how risk assessment ap-
proaches today function; these typically require a full comple-
ment of data on systems and assets, related vulnerabilities and
threats. These complex, autonomous black boxes, as described
by participants, therefore pose a fundamental challenge to how
we think about risk assessment for IoT systems.
5.3 How to address new elements of IoT risk?
The topic of new elements of risk in IoT systems was also
posed to participants. Specifically, we wanted to understand
two aspects related to our earlier hypotheses. Firstly, we aimed
to determine the extent that existing risk assessments consid-
ered the risk related to the logical glue (or innate knowledge)
that binds systems. Secondly, our goal was to gather profes-
sionals’ views on whether assessments may be lacking by only
regarding assets as items of value instead of also as platforms
of attack.
Participants views on these points were less detailed than other
issues, nonetheless, most individuals felt that both were valid
concerns worthy of some consideration in IoT risk assessment.
With regards to the binding of systems for instance, profes-
sionals could see how an intimate knowledge of how a system
works, even if only at the process-level, could lead to the in-
troduction of new risk if misused. What was not clearly under-
stood by interviewees however, was how such risks would be
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addressed in current assessment techniques. These techniques
appeared to be suited towards risks which focused on tangible
enterprise assets or threats. A similar situation emerged when
exploring the second point about viewing assets as platforms
of attack. To quote a participant:
The risk assessment has traditionally been the first
line of defence. It is, how to stop being compro-
mised, not, if you are compromised, how does that
then propagate i.e., what’s the next stage of the at-
tack.
This provides valuable insight into how some professionals
view the scope of risk assessment, i.e., as only the initial step.
When we explored this point further to determine what corpo-
rate security measures may cater for assets as attack platforms,
attack and impact pathways were mentioned by an interviewee.
These were regarded as more ‘live’ than risk assessments and
would model how the compromise of one system may lead to
other systems being exposed. Even in this case however, the
practitioner noted that it quickly becomes difficult to assess all
the possible impacts of something occurring. This difficulty in
traditional systems will only be exacerbated in the IoT, regard-
less of if these pathways are explored within or outside of the
risk assessment process.
5.4 Automated risk assessment in the IoT: Yea or Nay
The notion of automated risk assessment also led to signifi-
cant discussion amongst practitioners. This pertained to the
question of whether automated risk assessment was a feasi-
ble solution given how dynamic the IoT can become. Overall,
participants expressed that a fully automated risk assessment
process for the IoT was not feasible because of the presence of
social and human aspects in systems. This refers to the diffi-
culty of modelling and unpredictability of these aspects within
the system, and the human aspect (intelligence, insight and ex-
perience) of conducting the assessment itself.
Some professionals were also wary of automation due to the
numeric approaches that would be required to support it. These
approaches, in their opinion, were subjective and highly depen-
dent on the numbers input—numbers, which they note, are of-
ten precise but not necessarily accurate. This is a well-known
shortcoming of quantitative approaches towards defining and
assessing security risks [22].
Two other related challenges were mentioned by professions
in using automated approaches for the IoT. The first was in
determining appropriate levels of detail in which to conduct
such an assessment and the second was deciding how best to
combine detailed mathematical analyses on lower-level system
components (data, devices, software and subsystems) to define
an aggregated system-level risk. As aptly summarised by indi-
viduals:
There’s an issue with how much detail one goes into
with a risk assessment. Actually risk assessment is
about the aggregation of all of the individual risks
and looking at the big picture.
The real challenge is how to combine risks which are
at different levels that relate to the same system, to
determine the system-level risk. This is an area of
active investigation. Mathematical analysis could be
done, but this is difficult because accurate numbers
are largely ‘unknown’.
According to professionals, these issues were key reasons why
qualitative risk assessment methods were still preferred in in-
dustry. In those cases, discussions between risk officers and
company personnel would determine which series of high-
level categories (comparable to high, medium, low) to assign
to threat likelihoods, impacts and resulting risks. This raises
intriguing questions for the IoT given that a purely manual risk
assessment is infeasible in such a large set of constantly chang-
ing system components.
While participants were not keen on fully automated assess-
ment, some admitted that there was scope for computer-
assisted assessment approaches in connected systems. As
noted:
There is probably scope for computer-assisted risk
assessment, for example, where a computer automat-
ically maps the topology or devices on the network,
their software, patch levels, etc. Also, the computer
could help in qualitative assessments of risk, proba-
bility, impact, etc.
The features mentioned above are undoubtedly quite useful at
supporting manual risk assessment, but whether they could ad-
equately support highly dynamic IoT environments is still an
outstanding question. These environments encourage flexibil-
ity and fluidity in how devices, systems and data are used in
pursuit of fulfilment of the specified application scenario.
5.5 What role may collaborative risk assessment play?
The last significant point that arose from the sessions pertained
to collaborative risk assessment. In particular, some individ-
uals felt that the current status quo of disjointed, internally-
focused risk assessment would fail in IoT systems because of
their coupling with external parties. Going forward, compa-
nies would therefore need to broaden the scope of assessments
to incorporate business partners and other entities in their value
chain. One participant commented:
For future IoT risk assessments, this should be done
across the supply chain, jointly if possible. The econ-
omy can get much more dynamic if there is a risk as-
sessments process that allows action across the sup-
ply chain.
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This proposal of a more largely scoped and collaborative risk
assessment has value for numerous reasons. Firstly, it supports
a comprehensive understanding of an IoT system, secondly,
it allows a cross-enterprise appreciation of shared risk, and
thirdly, it could allow for resources to be pooled and weaker
(less security-inclined) organisations to be supported.
A challenge to be faced however, would be the social element
of organisations openly sharing their IoT risk data with part-
ners outside of rigid legal contracts. The field of threat in-
telligence sharing has enumerated a host of the issues present
(see [28]) as enterprises seek to work together for their joint
security. Furthermore, collaborative risk assessment has been
explored in the past (due to other technologies such as web
services), but has had little success outside of tightly coupled
(extended) enterprises [29]. This therefore does not relate well
to the IoT where coupling is dynamic and could be persistent
or ephemeral.
Instead of collaborative risk assessment, one professional
expressed that organisations will need to view inter-
organisational interactions and the risk they pose differently.
His view was that:
The more that organisations allow dynamic interac-
tions between services, a point will be reached quite
soon where they will have to assume that anything
that goes out of the organisation is compromised and
it doesn’t matter how good the companies are, there
will be a weak point on the chain. With these factors
in mind, risk assessment will now need to be based
on this knowledge.
This perspective is not unique and can be seen outside of
the IoT—in a PwC report for instance, a similar concept
was referred to as ‘operating in an assumed state of compro-
mise’ [30]. As mentioned by the individual, the main question
becomes how should risk assessment be changed to incorpo-
rate this view. It is also worth noting that while such a view
may suit security professionals, always assuming compromise
(e.g., of data received from partnering entities) can have a sig-
nificant impact on business efficiency. This is certain to raise
issues when we consider that a prime reason for the adoption
of the IoT is to increase efficient of services and applications.
5.6 Implications of our findings
Reflecting on our findings above, it is clear that there are sev-
eral challenges and open questions regarding conducting risk
assessments in the IoT environment. The evolving nature of
the IoT is advantageous given how it adapts to our needs, how-
ever, it also renders many features of existing risk assessment
approaches outdated. Instead of periodic assessments, more
dynamic techniques will need to be explored to identify, eval-
uate and prioritise risks in such progressive systems. These
techniques will also need to maintain a balance between dy-
namism, automation and human aspects, given the strong sup-
port for a social component to be present within risk assess-
ment. Moreover, while the extent to which automated and
mathematical methods are used is still an open question, these
have their own challenges. In particular, there is the on-going
difficulty in determining accurate values (about probability of
attack or cost of attack impacts) when adopting such tech-
niques to assess risks or risk components [22].
Another open question for the IoT pertains to the new series
of risks that are emphasised as a result of it, and how risks can
be assessed in such complex, automated, partially unknown
systems. This requires joint efforts by academia and industry,
both in researching potential approaches and trialling them on
real systems. A good example of this is the logical glue that
binds some IoT systems, and investigating how this may be
incorporated into risk assessment, particularly if it is to be dy-
namic. If we consider the challenge of unknown systems, one
way this may be addressed is by close collaboration and in-
formation sharing on risks between partnering businesses; i.e.,
collaborative assessment and expanded scopes of control and
trust. This, however, is likely to be difficult. Furthermore, it
may only work in cases where IoT systems across organisa-
tions are tightly and persistently coupled (much like those in
extended enterprises [29])—this is contrary to the fluid nature
of the IoT.
There are social and legal challenges worthy of note as well.
As IoT technologies become more ingrained into our world
(from aviation to healthcare) and into business environments
(offices to shop floors), a good security culture that appreciates
the risks is essential. The criticality of such a culture is not
new, but is further stressed in the IoT where security needs
to be viewed as a continuous activity. This requires enhanced
organisational awareness and training which appreciates how
we as humans engage with security [31, 32], and a progression
from a periodic assessment mentality.
While there are no specific regulations covering IoT security
at this time (and questions about their broad feasibility in gen-
eral [33]), there are many legal issues that may arise. For in-
stance, the European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [34] has strict requirements regarding the
collection and processing of personal data. Organisations will
therefore need to know exactly what data is collected by the
IoT systems they have deployed, and ensure that risk assess-
ments are suited to identify all associated risks. Another perti-
nent regulation is the NIS Directive which is an EU-wide leg-
islation on cybersecurity [35]. This also places a number of
other requirements on companies that will impact IoT systems,
including how they are assessed, secured and managed. Future
proposals for risk assessment in IoT systems will need to take
account of all of these aspects and local legislation in the coun-
try of operations.
6 Conclusion and future work
As the Internet of Things is adopted by more of society, the
importance of understanding the risks that accompany it is
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paramount. In this paper, we sought to examine a number of
key issues that pertain to identifying and assessing cyber-risk
in IoT systems. Our aim was to validate and complement our
earlier theory-driven research by gathering data and feedback
from relevant industry professions through a series of work-
shops and interviews. These would provide useful insight and
be based on real practitioner issues.
From an analysis of the data gathered, we confirmed several of
the issues hypothesised, particularly the challenge of assessing
risks in evolving IoT environments where knowledge of sys-
tems is constrained. Other key topics that emerged included
the perceived infeasibility of fully automated risk assessment
in the IoT, and a view towards inter-organisational assessment
of risk given IoT’s wide connectivity. With an appreciation
of these real-world challenges and industry insights, the next
step in our research is to develop an enhanced risk assessment
approach for the IoT. This would seek to address the issues de-
fined while balancing the dynamic nature of the IoT with the
rigour and structure of good risk assessment.
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